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Abstract
With the rapid growth of sensor technology, smartphone sensing has become an effective approach to
improve the quality of smartphone applications. However, due to time-varying wireless channels and lack of
incentives for the users to participate, the quality and quantity of the data uploaded by the smartphone
users are not always satisfying. In this paper, we consider a smartphone sensing system in which a
platform publicizes multiple tasks, and the smartphone users choose a set of tasks to participate in. In the
traditional non-cooperative approach with incentives, each smartphone user gets rewards from the platform
as an independent individual and the limit of the wireless channel resources is often omitted. To tackle
this problem, we introduce a novel cooperative approach with an overlapping coalition formation game
(OCF-game) model, in which the smartphone users can cooperate with each other to form the overlapping
coalitions for different sensing tasks. We also utilize a centralized case to describe the upper bound of
the system sensing performance. Simulation results show that the cooperative approach achieves a better
performance than the non-cooperative one in various situations.
Index Terms
smartphone sensing, incentive mechanism, overlapping coalition formation games.
21 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones today, with their good programmability and various embedded sensors,
are no longer just communication devices. They can also monitor and collect data
from surroundings, which then drive the development of new research on smartphone
sensing. The smartphone users can upload their sensed data for further processing and
help identify the routines of target population. Plenty of new applications have been
proposed based on smartphone sensing, e.g., traffic monitoring [1] [2], healthcare [3]
[4], and even social networking [5]. Generally, these applications can be classified into
three types [6]: individual sensing, group sensing and community sensing. We mainly
focus on the community sensing [7] [8], also known as mobile crowdsourcing in the
narrow sense, in which a certain number of users are encouraged to participate in the
smartphone sensing to ensure the quality of the large-scale applications.
Typically, a smartphone sensing system comprises a sensing platform with several
back-end servers on the Internet, and many smartphone users embedded with various
sensors. The platform publicizes multiple tasks, and recruits the smartphone users to
provide sensing services. The users then select and participate in one or more tasks, and
upload the sensed data to the platform for further analysis. When sensing and uploading
the data, the users need to consume their own resources, such as power, memory, time,
and wireless channel resources. Therefore, the users may not be interested in participat-
ing in the sensing tasks, unless they are rewarded to compensate their consumption of
resources. The sensing performance of the tasks cannot be guaranteed if the platform
do not recruit enough users, which then affects the quality of services that the platform
can provide. Thus, the incentive mechanisms for motivating the smartphone users need
to be considered [9] [10].
Some work has noticed the problem mentioned above and provides different incen-
tive mechanisms for the smartphone sensing systems. In [10], the users introduced a
platform-centric model in which the platform publicizes only one task, and a user-
centric model in which each user asks for a price for its sensed data. The user-centric
model is studied as a matching market and the truthfulness of pricing is guaranteed.
In [11], the authors proposed a bargain-based mechanism to encourage the cooperative
3message trading among the selfish nodes to maximize their rewards. Each task can only
be completed by one user, and they model the message transaction as a two-person
cooperative game, in which the Parieto optimum is achieved. In [12] - [15], different
incentive mechanisms based on various branches of the auction theory are designed to
reach a balance between the quality of the sensing services and the incentive cost.
Remarkably, most researchers assume that the users make independent decisions
when choosing the sensing tasks, and they do not know how their strategies influence
the sensing performance of each task. Based on this assumption, it is quite likely that
most users tend to participate in a popular task, while the other tasks cannot recruit
enough users. This may result in an unequal distribution of the users’ resources, and
thus, both the quality of the sensing services and the users’ rewards are affected. Besides,
in most works, the authors have not considered the limitation of each user’s available
wireless channel resources. However, in a general case in which the tasks require real-
time data uploading, or the required data feedback rate for uploading is relatively high,
the users’ limited resources may influence the sensing performance of the smartphone
sensing networks.
To avoid the resource imbalance problem mentioned above, we consider the coop-
eration among the users. Through cooperating and exchanging information with each
other, the users can know the specific situation of their preferred tasks so as to make
wiser choices of resource allocation. Taking into account the selfishness and rationality
of the users, we regard coalitional game theory as a suitable mathematical tool for
modeling the user cooperation and the internal relationship between them [16] - [18].
However, we find that most works utilizing the coalition formation games for the user
cooperation assume that one user can only join one coalition [19] [20] - [23], which does
not quite fit our scenario. In the smartphone sensing network, since each user can be
involved in multiple tasks, so the coalitions representing different sensing tasks may
overlapping with each other.
To capture this characteristic of the network, we then introduce the overlapping coali-
tion formation game (OCF-game) [24] in which the rational players can simultaneously
join multiple coalitions. Several works have applied the OCF-game in various fields [25]
- [27]. In [25], the authors considered both each user’s personal profits and how they
4influence the social welfare in a small-cell network. In [26], the authors assume that the
users are fully cooperative and the maximum social welfare can be obtained. In [27],
OCF-games are utilized to model the cooperation between the service providers in
the wireless relay networks, and a brief remark on the stability of a merge-and-split
algorithm is given. Though the assumptions and algorithms in these works are suitable
in the specific scenarios, few works have paid enough attention to the fact that most
users are rational players who only aim at maximizing their own welfare. In addition,
the information exchange and the cooperation cost should be considered when we
model an OCF-game.
The main contribution of this paper can be summed up as below. We aim at designing
an incentive mechanism in which the platform encourages the smartphone users to par-
ticipate in the sensing tasks by offering them rewards. In this mechanism, we consider
a general case in which the limited wireless channel resources may affect the quality
of the sensing services. To improve the sensing performance of the platform, we adopt
a novel cooperative approach in which the users cooperate to form different coalitions
based on various tasks, and the platform gives rewards directly to the coalitions, not
the users. We formulate the task selection problem as an OCF-game and we propose
a distributed overlapping coalition formation algorithm (OCF-algorithm) in which the
users can maximize their own profits by selecting multiple coalitions to join and in-
vesting the wireless resources. The properties of our proposed OCF-algorithm are then
analyzed. We also propose a traditional non-cooperative incentive mechanism which
serves as a comparison with the cooperative approach. Simulation results show that the
proposed cooperative approach with the OCF-algorithm can perform better than the
non-cooperative approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the system
model of both the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach. In Section 3,
we formulate the non-cooperative approach as a Stackelberg game, and solve it utilizing
the nonlinear optimization theory. In Section 4, we formulate the cooperative approach
as an OCF-game and propose an OCF-algorithm. In Section 5, simulation results are
presented and analyzed. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
52 SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a smartphone sensing system consisting of a platform with several servers
on the Internet, one wireless base station (BS), and some smartphones embedded with
various sensors, as shown in Fig. 1. In the system, the sensing platform publicizes N
sensing tasks, the set of which is denoted by N = {1, · · · , N}. The set of M smartphone
users, denoted by M = {1, · · · ,M}, can select multiple tasks to participate in and
then upload their sensed data to the platform via the BS. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the BS allocates K non-overlapping subcarriers, the set of which is
denoted by K = {1, · · · , K}, to the smartphone users in a single-cell OFDMA network.
The users then need to invest a certain amount of wireless channel resources into their
participating tasks for uploading their sensed data. We assume that each task has a
central location1. All the tasks and the smartphone users are randomly spread over a
square area with the side length L.
We define a K × M capacity matrix C = [ci,j ]K×M , where ck,j is the capacity of
subcarrier k for user j. The element ck,j can be given by
ck,j = Blog2
(
1 +
ps|hk,j|
2
σn2
)
, (1)
where B is the bandwidth of each subcarrier, ps is the transmitted power of the BS to
each user, hk,j ∼ CN
(
0, Dj
−δ
)
is the Rayleigh channel, δ is the path loss exponent, and
σn
2 is the noise variance.
To better describe the task selection of the users and the subcarrier allocation of the
BS, we define a N ×M task matrix X = {0, 1}, in which xi,j = 1 denotes that user j
participates in task i, and a K ×M subcarrier matrix S = {0, 1}, where sk,j = 1 denotes
that subcarrier k is assigned to user j.
It is worth noting that some tasks may require the participating users to upload quite
a bit of real-time sensed data, or the channel condition between the BS and a user may
not be satisfying. Therefore, it is possible that a user cannot finish the tasks due to its
limited data feedback rate. For any task i ∈ N , we assume that the minimum resources
1. This assumption is valid in practice. For example, if there is a task aiming at getting the noise map of a certain
area of interest, then we can set the centre of this area as the central location of this task.
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Fig. 1. System model of the smartphone sensing system.
that a participating user j needs to invest in task i is set to be data feedback rate ri.
Thus, we have the bandwidth constraint of each user as:∑
k∈K
sk,jck,j ≥
∑
i∈N
rixi,j , ∀j ∈M. (2)
For those cases in which the tasks require low feedback rate and the channel condition
is good enough, the bandwidth constraint is always satisfied. The system model can
then be degraded to one without bandwidth constraint as shown in [28]. Since each
subcarrier can only be assigned to one user, S is required to satisfy:∑
j∈M
sk,j ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ K. (3)
For any user j participating in task i, we assume that user j is charged by the BS for
the use of data feedback rate ri
2. Thus, for any task i ∈ N , the revenue that the BS gets
2. Note that this charge is usually asked by the service providers who lease the BS.
7from user j is:
Ri,j(X) = βrixi,j, (4)
where β is a scaling factor.
Once user j participates in task i, it collects and uploads the sensed data that task
i requires. We assume that each task has a specific area of interest (AoI), i.e., the area
from which a task collects the sensed data. User j’s contribution to task i is related to
the distance between them. The users in this area contribute the same to this task, while
those outsiders contribute less than the insiders. Specifically, for any user j ∈ M and
any task i ∈ N , if user j participates in task i, we define the contribution of user j to
task i as:
Qi,j =


ai
di,0
λ , di,j ≤ di,0
ai
di,j
λ , di,j > di,0
, (5)
where λ is an exponential factor, and di,0 is a constant representing the radius of
task i’s AoI. Since different tasks are provided by various third-party companies, the
contribution made to them is valued in different ways. One user may make different
contribution to two different tasks even when the distances between the user and these
two tasks are the same. Thus, we set ai as a scaling factor to describe the difference of
the tasks.
We assume that the sensing performance of task i, also known as task i’s profit,
increases proportionally with the total contribution of all the participating users, until
the contribution reaches a threshold ρi
3. Therefore, the sensing performance of any task
i is given by
Γi(X) =


ϕi
ρi
∑
j∈M
Qi,jxi,j,
∑
j∈M
Qi,jxi,j ≤ ρi,
ϕi,
∑
j∈M
Qi,jxi,j > ρi,
(6)
where
∑
j∈MQi,jxi,j represents the total contribution that the users make to task i, and
ϕi is the upper bound of task i’s sensing performance which corresponds to ρi. The
3. This assumption makes sense. For example, there is a task which is to measure the noise map of a certain area,
then once the number of the smartphone users who participate in this task exceed, say, 1000, those additional users
make little contribution.
8total profits of all the tasks, i.e., the platform sensing performance, is then given by:
PFM =
∑
i∈N
Γi(X). (7)
Note that the users are not willing to participate in the tasks without getting paid.
Therefore, the platform needs to reward the users for their contribution, which is usually
called the incentive mechanism. For a practical smartphone sensing system, the BS
allocates the subcarriers to the users and the platform provides an incentive mechanism,
while the users try to maximize their own profits obtained from the platform. In the
rest of this section, a centralized case is provided to be set as an upper bound, in which
the users are fully scheduled by the platform and the BS. We then study a practical
approach in which the users behave cooperatively, and set a non-cooperative approach
as a benchmark.
2.1 Centralized case
In the centralized case, the users are forced to participate in the tasks and get no rewards.
The platform and the BS together decide how to assign the subcarriers to the users and
how the users participate in the tasks. This case describes the upper bound of the system
sensing performance which does not exist in practice, because it is impossible that the
users are willing to participate in the tasks without any rewards.
The platform utility consists of two parts: the platform’s sensing performance and
part of the revenue from the BS. We present the platform utility as:
UCE = PFM +
∑
i∈N ,j∈M
γRi,j(X), (8)
where γ is the scaling factor.
Given the constraints (2) (3), the centralized case is then formulated as:
max
X,S
[∑
i∈N
Γi(X) + γβ
∑
i∈N
ri
∑
j∈M
xi,j
]
s.t.


∑
k∈K
sk,jck,j ≥
∑
i∈N
rixi,j ,∑
j∈M
sk,j ≤ 1.
(9)
9This is a 0-1 integer nonlinear programming problem (INLP problem), which can be
approximated by a convex function and solved by utilizing an optimization algorithm
[29] [30].
2.2 Non-cooperative approach
In the non-cooperative approach, the BS allocates the limited subcarriers to the users,
and the platform rewards the users for their individual contribution to the tasks. The
users make independent decisions on which tasks to participate in, based on the poten-
tial rewards they may get from the platform. For any user j ∈ M, the rewards it gets
are proportional to its total contribution to all the tasks, i.e., α1
∑
i∈N Qi,jxi,j , where α1
is a scaling factor describing the incentive intensity.
In practice, the service providers who lease the BS usually distribute part of the charge
of data feedback rate to the platform as revenue splits (for example, T-Mobile and the
third-party applications on T-Mobile Partner Network, PCCW Mobile and WeChat),
since the tasks that the platform publicizes increase the data traffic, thereby benefiting
the service providers. Therefore, the platform utility consists of three parts: the sensing
performance, the revenue splits from the BS, and the rewards paid to the users. We give
the platform utility as below:
Unonco =
∑
i∈N
Γi(X) +
∑
i∈N ,j∈M
γRi,j(X)− α1
∑
i∈N ,j∈M
Qi,jxi,j. (10)
The utility of any user j ∈M is then given by:
Cnoncoj = α1
∑
i∈N
Qi,jxi,j −
∑
i∈N
Ri,j(X). (11)
Since the task matrix X and the subcarrier matrix S are decided separately by the
users and the BS, we cannot formulate the problem as a joint optimization problem
as the one in the centralized case. Note that the BS first allocates the subcarriers to
the users, the users then decide which tasks to participate in based on the assigned
subcarriers. We then formulate the non-cooperative approach as a Stackelberg game,
which will be explained in detail in Section 3.
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2.3 Cooperative approach
In the traditional non-cooperative approach, each user makes independent decisions
when choosing the sensing tasks and their payoff is only related to their contributions
to the tasks. However, we may have a situation where too many users participate in one
task i due to its high input-output ratio, ϕi/ρi, such that task i’s performance reaches
the upper bound ϕi, and the wireless subcarrier resources of some users are wasted.
To avoid the unequal distribution of resources, we propose the cooperative approach
in which the users involved in the same task form a coalition, and the platform rewards
the coalition instead of individual users, based on the task’s performance instead of the
individual contribution of each user. Therefore, the users will not participate in those
tasks with enough users and saturated wireless channel resources when maximizing
their utility. The waste of subcarrier resources can be effectively avoided in the cooper-
ative approach.
We assume that the rewards for each task are proportional to the performance of this
task, i.e., for any task i ∈ N , the platform offers α2Γi (X) to the users completing this
task, with α2 as a scaling factor describing the incentive intensity. The platform utility
function is given by:
Uco =
∑
i∈N
Γi(X) +
∑
i∈N ,j∈M
γRi,j(X)− α2
∑
i∈N
Γi(X). (12)
The utility of any user j can be given by
Ccoj =
∑
i∈N
pi,j −
∑
i∈N
Ri,j(X), (13)
where pi,j represents the rewards that user j gains from the platform for participating
in task i, also known as user j’s payoff for partaking in task i. The specific form of pi,j
is determined by the incentive mechanism, which will be discussed in Section 4. Note
that no matter which incentive mechanism is chosen, the rewards for any task i ∈ N
are equal to the total payoff of the involved users, i.e.,
∑
j∈M pi,j = α2Γi(X).
In the cooperative approach, we assume that the subcarriers are allocated to the users
through some simple methods, which will be described in Section 4. Our goal is to
design an incentive mechanism in which the users behave cooperatively to maximize
11
their individual utility while the system can achieve a high utility. In Section 4, we will
discuss the cooperative approach in detail.
3 NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH
3.1 Stackelberg game formulation
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the optimization problem in the non-cooperative approach
can be divided into two subproblems: the task selection of the users and the subcarrier
allocation of the BS. We model the non-cooperative approach as a Stackelberg game, in
which there are two phases. In the first phase, the BS determines the allocation of the
subcarriers to the users. In the second phase, each user selects multiple sensing tasks
to participate in given the limit of their available resources. Therefore, the BS is the
leader and the users are the followers in the Stackelberg game. The strategy of the BS is
the distribution of the subcarriers, i.e., the subcarrier matrix S, while the strategy of user
j is the set of tasks that it participates in. The set of strategies of all the users can be
expressed by the task matrix X.
3.1.1 Task selection of the users
Suppose the subcarriers have been assigned to the users already, i.e., the subcarrier
matrix S is given. Each user j needs to choose which tasks to participate in, and to
invest the feedback rate into these tasks. For any user j, it aims at maximizing its own
utility Cnoncoj with the limit of available data feedback rate, which can be formulated as
a 0-1 knapsack problem. Given the subcarrier allocation, we assume that each user j has
a backpack with the capacity of
∑
k∈K ck,jsk,j . Each task i ∈ N is considered as an object
with the volume of ri and the value of α1Qi,j−βri. Every object can only be picked and
put into the backpack at most once. The goal of user j is to maximize the total value of
the backpack so that the sum of the volumes must be less than the knapsack’s capacity.
Thus for any user j ∈M, the task selection problem can be formulated as:
max
X
∑
i∈N
(α1Qi,j − βri) xi,j , xi,j ∈ {0, 1}
s.t.
∑
i∈N
rixi,j ≤
∑
k∈K
ck,jsk,j.
(14)
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The 0-1 knapsack problem has been proved to be an NP-hard one in which the closed
form solution cannot be given [31]. We perform a linear relaxation method to obtain a
closed-form sub-optimal solution which will be described in detail in Section 3.2.1.
3.1.2 Subcarrier allocation of the BS
The BS allocates the subcarriers without knowing how the users select the tasks. Note
that the task matrix X can be estimated with the help of the platform under the condition
of limited data feedback rate, i.e.
∑
k∈K
sk,jck,j ≥
∑
i∈N
rixi,j . Since the interests of the BS and
the platform are consistent with each other4, the platform can transmit the estimated
X to the BS. The BS then maximizes the platform utility by determining the subcarrier
matrix S.
max
S
Unonco
(
E (X)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈K
sk,jck,j≥
∑
i∈N
rixi,j
)
s.t.
∑
j∈M
sk,j ≤ 1.
(15)
We will discuss this problem in detail in Section 3.2.2.
3.2 Design of the non-cooperative algorithm
We first present the following theorem to state that there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium
in the formulated problem.
Definition 1: A pair of strategies (X, S) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if no unilateral
deviation in strategy by the leader or the follower is profitable, i.e.,
Unonco (S,X) ≥ Unonco (S,X
′)
Cnoncoj (S, xj) ≥ C
nonco
j (S, xj
′) .
(16)
Theorem 1: There exists a Stackelberg equilibrium in the formulated Stackelberg
game.
Proof: For a given subcarrier allocation scheme St, there exists an optimal task
selection solution for each user i, i.e., an optimal solution for the 0-1 knapsack problem
4. The BS divides part of the charge of the feedback rate to the platform as revenue splits, so the incline of the
platform utility also brings benefits for the BS.
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of user i. The set of best response of the users is denoted as X∗. Since there are finite
subcarrier allocation schemes for the BS, there always exists a set of best response of
the users i.e., X∗t , for each subcarrier allocation scheme St. Suppose the BS can estimate
the users’ best response X∗t according to their personal information. We can then find
a subcarrier allocation scheme Sop such that the BS can obtain the highest utility by
estimating the users’ best response. The set of the users’ best response can be obtained as
X∗op. Therefore, no player tends to change its current strategy with the others’ strategies
unchanged. We then say
(
Sop,X
∗
op
)
is a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Remark 1: The Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be reached within polynomial time.
Since there is no closed-form optimal solution for the 0-1 knapsack problem, the BS
cannot precisely estimate the users’ best response5, and thus the exact equilibrium point
of the Stackelberg game cannot be reached. Instead, we find a sub-optimal equilibrium
by utilizing a non-cooperative algorithm in which the BS estimates the best response of
the users via a linear relaxation method.
3.2.1 Each follower’s strategy
We assume that each user selects the tasks by using the linear relaxation method [32].
Within the limit of feedback rate, a user selects its most preferred task first then the
second preferred, the third preferred, and so on. To describe each user’s preference
on the tasks, we define a N ×M preference matrix as T = [ti,j]N×M , where ti,j is the
serial number of the ith-preferred task for user j. For example, t2,1 = 3 means that
user 1’s second preferred task in N is task 3. We assume that user j prefers task p to
task q if Qtp,j ,j/rtp,j ≥ Qtq,j ,j/rtq,j , and thus we have: Qt1,j ,j/rt1,j ≥ Qt2,j ,j/rt2,j ≥ · · · ≥
QtN,j ,j/rtN,j , ∀j ∈ M. Therefore, each user j’s strategy xj can be presented as below:
xi,j (S) =


1,
∑
k∈K
ck,jsk,j ≥
i∑
q=1
rtq,j ,
0, otherwise.
(17)
5. When the BS estimates the users’ best response to the subcarrier allocation, it needs a closed-form solution of the
knapsack problem so as to present the subcarrier allocation problem in a mathematical form based on the estimated
solution.
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3.2.2 The leader’s strategy
The platform can obtain the preference matrix by either the users’ reports to it or
machine learning based analysis on the users’ behaviours. The platform then report
the preference matrix T to the BS, and the BS predicts that user j will participate in
its ith-preferred task ti,j only when the total feedback rate of user j’s first i preferred
tasks is smaller than user j’s available feedback rate
∑
k∈K
ck,jsk,j . With the estimated X,
the maximization problem in (15) can be mathematically formulated as a 0-1 INLP
problem:
max
S
Unonco (X(S)) , sk,j ∈ {0, 1}
s.t.
∑
j∈M
sk,j ≤ 1,
(18)
where X(S) is given by (17). The formulated 0-1 INLP problem is NP-hard and the exact
solution takes exponential complexity [29] [33]. When we solve the 0-1 INLP problem
formulated in (18), a local optimal solution can be found by splitting the INLP problem
into multiple spherical LP problems, which can then be solved utilizing the branch and
bound method. As the scale of the network increases, the computational complexity of
this algorithm can be significantly high due to the growing number of variables and
constraints6.
3.2.3 Description of the non-cooperative algorithm
We now describe the overall algorithm for the non-cooperative approach. In phase 1,
before the BS allocates the subcarriers to the users, it will obtain a preference matrix
from the platform, and it assumes that the users will select the tasks according to
the preference matrix. Then the BS tries to maximize the expected platform utility
by allocating the subcarriers to the users. The BS formulates the problem as a 0-1
INLP problem and obtains the subcarrier matrix by solving it. In phase 2, given the
assigned subcarrier resources, each user maximizes its own utility by selecting the tasks
6. The 0-1 INLP problem formulated in the centralized case can be solved utilizing similar methods, but the
complexity of the centralized case is even higher than that of the non-cooperative approach, since there are more
variables to be settled in the centralized case with the same network parameters.
15
TABLE 1
Non-cooperative Optimization Algorithm
Phase 1: Subcarrier allocation to the users:
1) The platform obtains the preference matrix T by either behaviour analysis based machine learning
or the users’ reports to the platform.
2) The platform transmits the preference matrix T to the BS.
3) With the preference matrix T, the BS redefine the task matrix X as presented in (17), and solves the
maximization problem formulated in (18).
4) The BS assigns the set of subcarriers K according to the solution got from Step 1-1.
Phase 2: Task selection by the users:
1) Each user formulates its task selection problem as a 0-1 knapsack problem presented in (14), and
solves it using the linear relaxation method.
2) Each user j distributes its feedback rate to the tasks according to the solution got from Step 2-1.
to participate in. The overall non-cooperative optimization algorithm is presented in
Table 1.
Note that the optimal solution of the non-cooperative approach is to solve this prob-
lem as a joint optimization one, which is also a NP-hard problem. However, this is
not practical since the BS and the users make their decisions separately. The algorithm
proposed here is a step-by-step approach, in which the independence of the BS and
the users are considered, and each of the two steps in Table 1 can be solved using
existing literature. Therefore, we don’t guarantee the optimality of the solution, but it
gives a traditional method of designing an incentive mechanism in which the limit of
wireless channel resources is considered. The non-cooperative approach can serve as a
comparison to the cooperative approach, which will be presented in detail in Section 5.
The computational complexity of the non-cooperative algorithm mainly lies in solving
the 0-1 INLP problem in (18). We use an optimization software LINGO [34] to solve
this problem, and record the number of iterations to evaluate the complexity of this
algorithm. The comparison result with the cooperative approach will be presented in
Table 3 in Section 5.
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4 COOPERATIVE APPROACH USING OVERLAPPING COALITION FORMATION
GAMES
In this section, we assume that the subcarriers are allocated by the BS through either
the random allocation or the priority-based allocation, which will be explained in detail
in Section 4.2.1. The users participate in more than one task in most cases so as to
maximize their utility. Specifically, they may tend to cooperate with each other while
allocating their resources in order to avoid the waste of their resources. Based on this,
we focus on the cooperative behaviors of the users, and introduce the OCF-game in
which the users form overlapping coalitions to participate in the tasks. We assume that
the members of each coalition contribute the feedback rate to this coalition, and obtain
rewards from the platform according to the performance of the corresponding task.
Based on the OCF-game model, an overlapping coalition formation algorithm (OCF-
algorithm) is then proposed for the users, which converges to a stable overlapping
coalition structure (OCS).
4.1 Overlapping Coalition Formation Game Formulation
We begin by describing some notations and the model of OCF games. When presenting
the definitions, we make some modification while mostly following those in [17], [35], [36],
so as to fit our scenario better.
In the cooperative approach, any user j ∈ M is seen as a player, and the resources
of each user are the allocated feedback rate
∑
k∈K ck,jsk,j . User j’s strategy is denoted as
bj = (b
1
j , · · · , b
N
j ), where b
i
j = 1 denotes that user j participates in task i and invests ri
bits of resources into this task. The set of all the strategies of user j is denoted as Bj .
With the notion of bij , we then define the coalition for task i ∈ N as b
i = (bi1, · · · , b
i
M),
where bij = 1 also represents that user j is a member of coalition i. The support of
coalition bi, denoted by supp(bi), is defined as supp(bi) = {j ∈ M|bij = 1}, which
represents the set of coalition members. Note that we allow the support of a coalition
to be empty if there is no user participating in the corresponding task. As we have
mentioned in Section 2, once user j joins any coalition bi, it needs to invest at least ri
bits of resources into this coalition. Thus, to avoid individual resource waste, the users
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may only want to divide their resources in a discrete manner when investing. Note that
the discrete manner of resource allocation guarantees the integral transmission of the
sensed data, and avoids developing a vague bound on the number of potential coalition
structures.
Now we give the value of a coalition bi by a characteristic function v : [0, 1]M → R+.
Based on the performance of a task that we have explained in (6), the value of coalition
bi is then defined as:
v(bi) = α2Γi =


ϕi
ρi
∑
j∈M
Qi,jb
i
j ,
∑
j∈M
Qi,jb
i
j ≤ ρi,
ϕi, otherwise,
(19)
where α2Γi is the total rewards that the platform gives to the users participating in task
i, and Qi,jb
i
j is the contribution that user j makes to coalition b
i. The characteristic form
of the value function (19) implies that the value of a coalition is completely decided by
the members of the coalition. To be specific, the value of the coalition depends on the
coalition members’ contribution to it.
With all the concepts mentioned above, the proposed OCF-game is then defined as
below.
Definition 2: An OCF-game G = (M, v) is defined by a set of users M = {1, · · · ,M}
and a value function v : {0, 1}M → R+ where v(0M) = 0. The characteristic form of the
value function is given in (19).
In an OCF-game G = (M, v), an overlapping coalition structure (OCS) overM is aM×N
matrix Θ = (b1, · · · , bN), where N is the number of coalitions. Since we have N tasks
corresponding to N coalitions in the system, the size of an OCS is fixed to be N . It is
also required that
N∑
i=1
bijri ≤
∑
k∈K ck,jsk,j , which guarantees that Θ is a valid division of
the users’ resources.
The value of coalition bi is also the payoff that needs to be divided among the users
who contribute to coalition bi, i.e., the members of supp(bi). Here, we define the payoff
distribution as a finite list of vectors P = {p1, . . . , pN}, and pi ∈ RM is the payoff vector
for the members in coalition bi that satisfies
M∑
j=1
pi,j = v
(
bi
)
.
We assume that the value of a coalition is assigned to and only to its coalition members
due to their participation levels, and the payoff of any coalition member is unaffected
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by those outsiders. For any user j ∈ M, the payoff obtained from coalition bi is the
rewards that user j gets from the platform for participating in task i, which can be
mathematically given by
pi,j = φj(b
i) =


v(bi)
Qi,j∑
q∈supp(bi)
Qi,q
, j ∈ supp(bi),
0, j /∈ supp(bi).
(20)
With the utility function (13) and the payoff equation (20), we can then obtain the
specific form of a user’s utility, which is omitted here.
Note that the charge of data rate and the value function of a coalition are two
important factors of governing each coalition’s size. As the size of a coalition increases,
the value of the coalition grows and will stop increasing at some point where each user’s
payoff begins to decrease. Thus, no additional user would like to join the coalition at
which point it will not gain any positive utility.
4.2 Design of Overlapping Coalition Formation Algorithm
In our proposed OCF-game, the direct motivation of user j ∈M is to increase its utility
Ccoj . As mentioned in Section 4.1, user j may not gain positive utility from joining a
coalition, since in some cases the payoff that user j obtains from this coalition is less than
the charge of feedback rate. Therefore, user j needs to consider carefully when joining a
new coalition. Besides, the other members of this coalition have right to decide whether
to accept this user according to their own utility. Likewise, a user also needs to consider
quitting a coalition if it cannot obtain any positive utility from this coalition.
For the convenience of discussion, we classify the fundamental operations of a user
into three categories: transfer operation, quitting a coalition and joining a new coalition.
Each kind of operations will lead to a change in OCS. We will then introduce the
concepts of these three operations and give the corresponding execution conditions in
our proposed OCF-game.
Definition 3: For any user j ∈ M in the proposed OCF-game with the current OCS
Θ = {b1, . . . , bN}, a transfer operation from coalition bp ∈ Θ to coalition bq ∈ Θ, denoted
by Tj(b
p, bq), is to withdraw all of user j’s invested resources, i.e., rp, from coalition b
p
and invest the required amount of resources, i.e., rq, into coalition b
q.
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After user j withdraws its resources from coalition bp, it quits this coalition. Coalition
bp then becomes bp−, which satisfies bp−
j
= 0, i.e., user j is not a member of coalition
bp−. Similarly, after user j transfers its resources to coalition bq, it joins this coalition
as a new member. Coalition bq then becomes bq+ satisfying bq+
j
= 1. The new OCS is
expressed as Θ′ = Θ\{bp, bq}∪{bp−, bq+}. Note that the above notions bp− and bq+ only
take effect within a transfer operation to describe the change of the coalitions.
When we further judge whether the transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq) is feasible for user
j ∈M, a series of conditions should be satisfied first. Considering the limited feedback
rate of user j, we have: ∑
i∈N\{p,q}
rib
i
j − rp + rq ≤
∑
k∈K
ck,jsk,j. (21)
If the utility that user j gets from joining coalition bq is positive and larger than that
from joining coalition p, the transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq) is profitable for user j itself, i.e.,
φj
(
b
q+
)
− βrq > max
{
0, φj
(
b
p−
)
− βrp
}
. (22)
However, even if the transfer operation Tj (b
p, bq) is profitable for user j, it is not
necessary that this transfer operation is feasible. The payoff of other users in coalition bq
should be considered as well due to the characteristics of the coalitions. Normally, when
a user j tends to invest its resources to coalition bq, the members of coalition bq has
right to decide whether to accept this user. If the utility of other users in coalition bq is
affected when user j joins this coalition, then these users are not willing to let user j in.
Note that user j removes all its resources from coalition bp when executing the transfer
operation, so it has no stake in what other members in coalition bp will react. Therefore,
before user j makes a transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq), it needs to obtain the information
from other members of coalition bq in order to judge whether this transfer operation is
permitted. We then formally define a transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq) as permitted by all of the
other members in coalition bq if it satisfies:
φk(b
q+) ≥ φk(b
q), ∀k ∈ {supp(bq)|k 6= j}. (23)
With all the conditions mentioned above, the feasibility of a transfer operation can be
defined as follows:
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Definition 4: In the proposed OCF-game with the current OCS Θ = {b1, . . . , bN}, the
transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq) is feasible and can be executed if it satisfies (21), (22), (23).
However, the transfer operation is not the only action that the users consider while
shifting their resource allocation. A user j can choose to just quit a coalition bp, and
not to reinvest the resources into any other coalitions. We assume that once user j quits
coalition bp, it withdraws all its resources invested into this coalition, i.e., bpj = 0, and
user j gets no payoff from coalition bp. User j considers quitting coalition bp when
it cannot obtain positive utility from this coalition or any potential transfer operations.
Therefore, it is feasible for any user j to quit coalition bp if:

φj(b
p)− βrp ≤ 0,
Tj (b
p, bq) is not profitable for user j, ∀q ∈ {M|bqj = 0}.
(24)
Likewise, when shifting its resource allocation, user j can also choose to just join
a new coalition bq, and invest its resources into this coalition. This consideration is
reasonable since it is possible that after user j executes a transfer operation Tj(b
s, bt), it
may have extra resources uninvested, so user j may consider joining a new coalition bq.
For its own sake, user j only considers joining a new coalition bq when it has enough
resources to invest and can get positive utility from coalition bq. Besides, the utility of
other members in coalition bq should be considered as well. Therefore, it is feasible for
any user j to join a new coalition bq if:

φj(b
q)− βrq > 0,∑
i∈N\{q}
bjiri + rq ≤
∑
k∈K
ck,jsk,j,
φk(b
q+) ≥ φk(b
q), ∀k ∈ {supp(bq)|k 6= j}.
(25)
4.2.1 Algorithm Description
We now describe the proposed OCF-algorithm, which is designed for solving the re-
source allocation problem of the users in a distributed way. The algorithm consists of
two phases: the subcarrier allocation phase and the coalition formation phase as shown
in Table 2.
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In the first phase, the BS assigns the subcarriers to the users through the random
allocation or the priority-based allocation. In the random allocation method (Step 1-
1), each subcarrier is randomly assigned to a user in the system. In the priority-based
allocation (Step 1-2), the platform first collects the users’ location information with the
help of the location-based service. It then evaluates the potential contributions that each
user j can make to all the tasks according to RKj =
∑
i∈N Qi,j/ri. Each user’s priority
is determined by the BS based on the decreasing order of {RKj}Mj=1. In each round of
subcarrier allocation, the BS allocates the unassigned subcarriers to the set of users one
by one according to the priority list, i.e., user p is allocated its currently most preferred
subcarrier among the unassigned subcarriers ahead of user q if RKp > RKq. Each user
is allocated one subcarrier in each round, and the iteration stops until all the subcarriers
have been allocated.
In the second phase, for a given value of α2, each user initially chooses a set of
coalitions to join utilizing a linear relaxation algorithm, i.e., the same algorithm that
the platform uses to predict the users’ behaviors in Section 3.2 (Step 2-1 and Step 2-2).
Based on the initial set of coalitions, multiple iterations are performed by the users until
a stable OCS is formed. We now provide a brief description of the algorithm during one
iteration, i.e., from Step 2-3 to Step 2-8. In Step 2-3 and 2-4, each user j first records its
current strategy as bj , then it considers whether to quit coalition i if it can’t get positive
utility from this coalition. User j can only quit coalition bi when its quitting does not
damage other members’ profits. In Step 2-5, each user j keeps trying the transfer operation
between corresponding coalitions, until there is no feasible transfer operations for user j.
After executing the transfer operations, each user j will check whether it is feasible join
any new coalitions. From Step 2-6 to 2-8, each user j records its current strategy as
bj
′ after all the operations performed above. The iterations stop if each user’s strategy
before and after shifting the resources remains the same. We say that the users converge
to a stable OCS and they stop shifting their resources.
It should be noted that the resource allocation problem we solve here is an NP-
hard problem [38], which means that the optimal solution can’t be achieved within
polynomial time. So it is normal that the final OCS is not guaranteed to be optimal. This
can be explained in a straightforward way as below. In the network, the most important
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thing for the users is to maximize their own profits gained from the coalitions, so in
most cases they are not fully cooperative. Therefore, the final OCS is not always socially
optimal.
4.3 Analysis of the OCF Algorithm
4.3.1 Stability and convergence
Different from the traditional coalition formation games, the OCF-game is still an on-
going topic and there exist no general stability concepts [35] [37]. In [24], the concept of
core is introduced to describe the stability of the OCF-games, however, this concept is
not suitable for our proposed OCF-game model. First, the users’ resources are limited
in our scenario, while the users’ resources are infinite in [24]. Second, we consider the
cost of the users for using the resources (i.e., the charge of data feedback rate) in our
scenario, and thus, the users’ behaviors are modeled slightly differently. Therefore, we
incorporate the concept of stability in the traditional cooperative games [36] [39] and
extend it in our proposed OCF-algorithm by defining the concept of T-stable OCS as
below.
Definition 4: In the proposed OCF-game with the OCS Θ = {b1, · · · , bN}, for any
user j ∈ M, if it cannot make any feasible transfer operations, or quit any coalitions, or
join any new coalitions in its strategy bj ∈ Bj given the strategies of the other users
{b1, · · · , bM} \bj , then we say the OCS Θ here is T-stable.
In other words, a T-stable OCS in our proposed OCF-game corresponds to an equi-
librium state in which no user has the incentive to shift its resource allocation from the
already formed coalitions. Therefore all the users stick to their current strategies and
no change happens in the T-stable OCS.
Lemma 1: If the OCF-algorithm can converge to a final OCS Θ∗, then we say this
OCS is T-stable.
Proof: According to our proposed OCF-algorithm in Table 2, when proposed OCF-
algorithm converges to a terminal OCS Θ∗, each user j’s strategy satisfies: (i) there is no
feasible transfer operations for user j; (ii) there is no coalition that is feasible for user j to
quit. Thus, the strategy that user j ∈ M takes must be the best strategy bj
∗ for user j
in current situation, i.e., Cj co(Θbj∗,b−j) > Cj co(Θbj ,b−j ), ∀bj ∈ Bj . Therefore, there is no
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TABLE 2
Overlapping Coalition Formation Algorithm for Smartphone Sensing
Step 1: Subcarrier Allocation Phase
The BS allocates the subcarriers to the users through either of the following methods:
1) random allocation: for all k ∈ K
a) j∗ = random({j, ∀j ∈M}).
b) allocate subcarrier k to user j∗.
2) priority-based allocation:
a) Define {RKj}
M
j=1, RKj ∈ R, {χj}
M
j=1, χj ∈ {1,M}, and {ζj}
M
j=1, ζj ∈ {1, K}.
b) Set RKj =
∑
i∈N
Qi,j/ri.
c) Sort RKj from largest to smallest, then record the corresponding index j in χ as χj .
d) For all χj ∈ {1,M},
i) ζχj = argmax
k∈K
{ck,χj }.
ii) Assign subcarrier ζχj to user j, and then remove subcarrier ζχj from K.
Step 2: Coalition Formation Phase
1) Obtain task priority vector tj = (t1,j , t2,j , · · · , tN,j) for all j ∈M.
2) For all i ∈ N and all j ∈M,
a) If
∑
k∈K ck,jsk,j ≥
i∑
q=1
rtq,j , b
i
j = 1.
b) Else bij = 0.
3) Each user j ∈M records its strategy g
j
.
4) For all i ∈ N and all j ∈M,
a) If pi,j −Ri,j < 0, judge whether there exists a profitable transfer operation Tj(b
i, bk) for user j.
i) If so, execute Tj(b
i, bk).
ii) Else, if φk(b
i−) ≥ φk(b
i),∀k ∈ {supp(bi)|k 6= j} stands, user j quits coalition i.
5) For user j = 1 to M
a) Let R ⊆ Θ be the set of coalitions that contains user j.
b) Select two coalitions bp,ℓ and bq,ℓ in R, the pair never shows; otherwise go to Step 2-5-d.
c) If Tj(b
p,ℓ, bq,ℓ) is feasible, execute this operation and go to Step 2-5-b, else go back to Step 2-5-b.
d) For all i ∈ N , check if it is feasible for user j to join coalition i. If so, user j joins coalition i.
e) Turn to another user and go to Step 2-5-a.
6) Set η = 0. For user j = 1 to M ,
a) Each user j records its strategy as g
j
′.
b) If g
j
is identical with g
j
′, set η = η + 1 and g
j
= g
j
′.
c) Else set g
j
= g
j
′.
7) If η = M , go to Step 2-8.
8) Else go to Step 2-3.
9) Finalize the coalition structure and then go to Step 3.
Step 3: End of the algorithm.
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user j ∈ M that can improve its utility by a unilateral change in its strategy bj ∈ Bj .
Hence, the terminal OCS Θ∗ is T-stable.
Theorem 2: Starting from the initial OCS, our proposed OCF-algorithm based on
the users’ shift in their resource allocation converges to a T-stable OCS after limited
iterations.
Proof: After the initiation of the users’ strategies, the initial OCS is Θ0. Based on the
iterations in which the users try to maximize their utility, we can express the change of
OCS as follows:
Θ0 → Θ1 → Θ2 → · · · . (26)
After iteration ℓ, the OCS changes from Θℓ−1 to Θℓ, and the strategy of any user j
changes from bj(ℓ− 1) to bj(ℓ), which satisfies C
co,ℓ−1
j < C
co,ℓ
j . Since the transfer operation
Tj(b
p, bq) is guaranteed to be a feasible one, the utility of both user j and other members
of coalition bq will not be affected due to user j’s shift in resource allocation. As for
the members of coalition bp which user j quits, we prove that their utility will not be
affected by Tj(b
p, bq) as below. According to equation (20), the payoff of any user k
obtained from coalition bp before user j quits can be expressed as:
pp,k = φk(b
p) = v(bp)
Qp,k∑
j∈supp(bp)
Qp,j
, (27)
and the payoff that any user k obtains from coalition bp after user j quits is:
pp,k
′ = φk(b
p−) = v(bp−)
Qp,k∑
j∈supp(bp−)
Qp,j
. (28)
Given the value function of coalition bp in (19), the size relationship of v(bp) and v(bp−)
can be divided into three conditions:
(i) v(bp) < ϕp,
v(bp)∑
j∈supp(bp)
Qp,j
=
v(bp−)∑
j∈supp(bp−)
Qp,j
=
ϕp
ρp
⇒ pp,k = pp,k
′.
(29)
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(ii) v(bp) = ϕp, and v(b
p−) < ϕp,
v(bp)∑
j∈supp(bp)
Qp,j
≤
v(bp−)∑
j∈supp(bp−)
Qp,j
=
ϕp
ρp
⇒ pp,k ≤ pp,k
′.
(30)
(iii) v(bp) = v(bp−) = ϕp
v(bp)∑
j∈supp(bp)
Qp,j
<
v(bp−)∑
j∈supp(bp−)
Qp,j
<
ϕp
ρp
⇒ pp,k < pp,k
′.
(31)
Therefore, we can imply that when user j quits a coalition bp, the utility of other
members in this coalition will not be affected, and thus, no users’ utility will decrease
due to the transfer operation of any user j. Likewise, the users’ utility do not decrease
when user j quits a coalition or joins a new coalition, as shown in (24) and (25).
Therefore, after iteration ℓ, each user’s utility increases or at least remains the same,
and the total utility of all the users won’t decrease. This also reflects that our proposed
algorithm prevents the users from forming an OCS which has previously appeared.
Given the number of the users and the discrete manner in which the users allocate
their resources, the total number of possible OCS is finite. The total utility of all the
users has an upper bound due to the limited resources that the users process. Therefore,
our proposed algorithm is guaranteed to reach a final OCS within limited iterations.
According to Lemma 1, the final OCS resulting from the proposed OCF-algorithm is
T-stable.
4.3.2 Complexity
Note that the total number of iterations cannot be given in the closed form since we do
not know for sure at which moment the users form a T-stable OCS, which is common
in the design of most heuristic algorithms. We will show the distribution of the total
number of iterations in Fig. 2 and will give corresponding analysis in Section 5.
Note that the computational complexity mainly lies in the number of both the iter-
ations and the attempts of transfer operations in the coalition formation phase. Below
we analyze the number of transfer operations in each iteration. We consider the worst
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case in which each user j joins ⌈N/2⌉ coalitions. In one iteration, each user j ∈M tries
at most ⌈N/2⌉ (N − ⌈N/2⌉) attempts of transfer operations, so the overall number of the
attempts in the worst case is M ⌈N/2⌉ (N − ⌈N/2⌉). In practice, one iteration requires a
significantly lower number of attempts, since the number of coalitions that a user joins
is usually much smaller than ⌈N/2⌉.
4.3.3 Signaling Cost
To describe the signaling cost over the control channels in the proposed OCF-algorithm,
we assume that η messages are required when a value or the location information of
user j is transmitted. We also assume that µ messages are required when the id of a
user or a task is transmitted. In the subcarrier allocation phase, each user j ∈M needs
to report to the platform its id and the location information. Therefore, MNη + Mµ
messages are required in the first phase. Here we do not count the messages transmitted
between the platform and the BS. In the coalition formation phase, when considering
a transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq), each user j needs to be informed of the members’ id and
location information7 in coalition bq, i.e.,
{
dq,k
∣∣k ∈M, gqj = 1 ∧ gqk = 1}. The platform
needs to inform user j of the value of ρi and ϕi. To obtain the upper bound of the
signaling cost in one iteration, we consider the worst case in which each user joins
⌈N/2⌉ coalitions in one iteration. In this case, the signaling cost of all the users is
M ⌈N/2⌉ (N − ⌈N/2⌉) [(M + 1) η + (M − 1)µ] messages. Besides, after the users decide
which coalitions to participate in, they need to report to the platform the id of their cho-
sen coalitions, and the platform offers corresponding rewards to them, which requires
at most 2MNµ messages.
Note that the signaling cost of the proposed OCF-algorithm increases quickly with
both the number of coalitions and the size of each coalition. Nevertheless, the size of
coalitions is constrained by the limited subcarrier resources that each user has access
to, and the number of coalitions equals to the number of tasks. Therefore, the signaling
cost of the proposed OCF-algorithm can be restricted to a tolerable level.
7. User j needs to calculate how much payoff it can obtain from coalition bq if it executes transfer operation Tj(b
p, bq).
According to equation (5) and (20), once user j obtains other members’ location information in coalition bq, it can
know these members’ contribution to coalition bq , then user j’s potential payoff from bq can be obtained.
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5 SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithms, we use a simulation setup
as follows. We consider a 10km×10km square area where the tasks and the users are
randomly located. The BS is located at the centre of this square area. The number of
the subcarriers is 60. We set the average transmission power of a smartphone Pu =
23dBm, noise variance of the transmission channel σ2 = −90dBm, the bandwith of each
subchannel B = 15kHz, scale factor β = 7, γ = 0.2 and the exponential factor λ = 0.8.
To depict the difference of the tasks, we assume that the upper bound of any task i’s
sensing performance ϕi is uniformly distributed within a range of 90 ∼ 150. Similarly, the
threshold of a user’s effective contribution to task i, ρi, is uniformly distributed within
a range of 35 ∼ 60. The scaling factor ai is uniformly distributed within a range of
3 ∼ 7. The data transmission rate required by task i, ri, is uniformly distributed within
a range of 6 ∼ 12Mb/s, and the radius of task i’s AoI, di,0 is uniformly distributed
within a range of 0.6 ∼ 2.5km. All the curves are generated based on averaging over
1000 instances of the algorithms.
Denote the random variable Y˜ as the total number of iterations required for the OCF-
algorithm to converge. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Y˜ ,
Pr
(
Y˜ ≤ y˜
)
, versus y˜ for different number of users, with the number of the tasks as 30.
We observe that the speed of convergence becomes faster as the number of the users
decreases. Fig. 2 further reflects that the computational complexity is rather low in our
proposed algorithm. For example, when the number of the users is 20, we observe
that on average a maximum of only 80 iterations are needed for the OCF-algorithm
convergence.
In Table 3, we show the number of iterations in both the OCF-algorithm and the
non-cooperative algorithm with the number of tasks set as 20. For the non-cooperative
algorithm, we give the number of iterations when solving the 0-1 INLP problem in (18)
with optimization tolerance set to 0.01. For the OCF-algorithm, we set the number of
iterations as the worst-case value. From this table, we can see that the computational
complexity of the non-cooperative approach is extremely high compared to that of the
OCF-algorithm.
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Fig. 2. CDF of the total number of iterations in the OCF-algorithm versus the number of
iterations with the number of the tasks N = 20.
TABLE 3
Number of iterations in the OCF-algorithm and the non-cooperative algorithm
Number of the users
(20 tasks)
20 30 40 50
Number of iterations
using OCF-algorithm
80 120 170 240
Number of iterations
using Non-cooperative
algorithm
over 106 over 2.5× 106 over 4× 106 over 5× 106
Fig. 3 shows the platform utility in the non-cooperative approach as a function of
the value of α1, and the platform utility in the cooperative approach as a function of
the value of α2. From the curves in Fig. 3a, we see that there exists a best value of α1
which makes the platform utility reach the peak value. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the
value of α1 reflects the degree how the platform motivates the users. When α1 is too
29
2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
Incentive intencity α1
Pl
at
fo
rm
 u
tili
ty
 
 
20 users
40 users
60 users
80 users
(a) Non-cooperative approach
1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
Incentive intensity α2
Pl
at
fo
rm
 u
tili
ty
 
 
20 users
40 users
60 users
80 users
(b) Cooperative approach
Fig. 3. The platform utility effected by the value of the incentive intensity α1 in the non-
cooperative approach, and by the value of the incentive intensity α2 in the cooperative
approach, with the number of the tasks N = 30
small, the incentive mechanism does not work effectively since the users are not willing
to participate in the tasks with such a low payoff. When α1 is too large, the incentive
cost is so much for the platform that it affects the platform utility though the users
are well motivated. Therefore, there must exist a value of α1 that achieves the highest
platform utility, i.e., the trade-off between the incentive cost and the incentive effect
can be achieved. Similar analysis stands for the curves of the cooperative approach in
Fig. 3b. In both subgraphs, the best incentive intensity changes as the number of users
changes.
Fig. 4 shows the best values of α1 and α2 as a function of the number of users in both
the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach. From Fig. 4, the best value
of α1 decreases as the number of users grows in the non-cooperative approach, while
the best value of α2 increases as the number of users grows in the cooperative approach.
This is because in the non-cooperative approach, as the users are becoming more, the
competition between the users participating in the tasks is more intense. However, there
is no improvement in their utilization of the subcarrier resources, and thus, the platform
needs to cut its incentive cost so to maintain as much platform utility as possible. In
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Fig. 4. The best values of the incentive intensity α1 and α2 effected by the number of
users in the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach with the number of
the tasks N = 30.
the cooperative approach, as the number of the users increases, the users can utilize the
subcarrier resources more efficiently by cooperating with each other, thus there is still
a rising space for the platform utility if the incentive intensity is larger.
Fig. 5 shows the best values of α1 and α2 as a function of the number of tasks in both
the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach with the number of the
users set as 80. The best values of α1 and α2 decease as the number of tasks increases,
which means that the best incentive intensity responses the same to the change of
the number of the tasks in both approaches. This is because when there are more
tasks in the network, the users are more selective about the tasks to participate in,
so both the competition in the non-cooperative approach and the cooperation in the
cooperative approach are weakened. Therefore, the users themselves are more inclined
to participate in the sensing tasks since there is more opportunity for them now to
gain high profits from those newly publicized tasks, which leads to the decrease of the
31
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
Number of tasks
In
ce
nt
iv
e 
in
te
ns
ity
   
α
1 
& 
α
2
 
 
OCF−algorithm random
OCF−algorithm priority
Non−cooperative Algorithm
α1
α2
Fig. 5. The best values of the incentive intensity α1 and α2 effected by the number of
tasks in the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach with the number of
the users M = 80.
platform’s incentive cost.
Fig. 6 shows the platform utility as a function of the number of users with the number
of the tasks set as 25. The optimal values of α1 and α2 are adopted in the algorithms
separately. The platform utility increases with the number of users, and turns out to be
diminishing returns, which can be explained as below. As the number of users increases,
the platform can recruit more users, thereby improving the social welfare. However, the
number of the subcarriers is limited to 60 and one subcarrier can only be assigned to
a single user, so at most 60 users have access to the tasks. Besides, as the number of
users grows, the contribution they make to the platform become saturated, and thus, the
platform utility increases to reach a stable value, which leads to the diminishing returns
of the curves. In addition, Fig. 6 shows the upper bound of the platform utility, which
is represented by the result of the centralized case, where the users get no payoff from
the platform. The OCF-algorithm performs better than the non-cooperative approach
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Fig. 6. Impact of the number of users to platform utility with the number of the tasks
N = 25.
since the waste of resources is avoided in the OCF-algorithm, which helps improve the
sensing performance.
Fig. 7 shows the platform utility as a function of the number of tasks with the number
of the users set as 80. We observe that as the platform publicizes more tasks, the platform
utility increases and converges to a maximum value. When there are too many tasks
in the system, the users are not able to participate in every task due to their limited
subcarrier resources, and thus, there is always a point at which the platform utility
reaches a maximum value. Besides, we can see that the cooperative approach performs
better than the non-cooperative one.
Fig. 8 shows the platform sensing performance as a function of the number of users
with the number of tasks set as 25. Note that the platform’s sensing performance directly
reflects the effects of different algorithms. The trends of all the methods are similar
with those of the platform utility, but the gaps between various methods are narrowed,
because the differences of incentive cost are not considered here.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed two incentive mechanisms applying the non-cooperative
approach and the cooperative approach, respectively, for the smartphone sensing sys-
tem. There are four factors that influence the platform utility, which are the numbers
of users, tasks and subcarriers, and the incentive intensity of the mechanism. The
numbers of users, tasks and subcarriers are three factors restricted with each other,
i.e., with two of these factors fixed, the platform utility increases and flattens out as
the third one grows. The incentive intensity of the mechanism in the non-cooperative
approach and the cooperative approach, i.e., α1 and α2, respectively, greatly influences
the platform utility by affecting the users’ behaviors. A trade-off between the incentive
cost and the incentive effect of the platform can be achieved by trying different values
of the incentive intensity. There exists the best value of the incentive intensity in both
approaches. From the simulation results, when the best values of α1 and α2 are adopted
in the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative approach, respectively, the latter
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one performs better than the former one in terms of both the platform utility and the
sensing performance.
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